The Antichrist

Nietzsche describes Buddhism as stemming from the philosophical elite, viewing its own idea of “perfection” as fully attainable by mortals.

By contrast, Christianity stems from the “lowest” individuals, glorifying grotesquery and self-loathing.

Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a religion that ultimately seeks to tame “beasts of prey” (i.e., the Hyperboreans and those capable of becoming like them) and subjugate them within the masses of lower individuals (29).

By contrast, Buddhism applies itself to a society already civilized by advanced philosophy and seeks to bring it to completion. Here, Nietzsche deliberately describes Europe as “not yet civilized” (29).

Nietzsche lauds Buddhism for having the courage to see suffering as being as much a part of the world as any other experience—free of moral judgment. Christianity, on the other hand, invents demons and sins to explain why suffering is so terrible and to separate the religion from its own idealized, imaginary version of a “perfect” reality.

He acknowledges Christianity’s shrewdness in recognizing that by creating a religion of “love,” its believers would withstand any suffering—even the removal of their own power (30).

Nietzsche argues that the origin of Christianity was not a reactionary force acting against Judaism, but an evolution of it. He labels both Christianity and Judaism as religions with moralities grounded in ressentiment—making Christian antisemitism a further moral corruption born of self-loathing.

Nietzsche lauds the Jewish people for facing fatal odds and making the choice to survive “at all costs,” even if this cost was to “go against nature”—which he argues is a choice that could only have been made by a people free of décadence (32).

Nietzsche argues that any study of Israel’s history should consider itself as being part of the history of a “denaturizing” civilization (32). In Israel’s origins as nation and kingdom, Judaism saw its God as a being to give thanks to—something Nietzsche believes is perfectly normal in any religion.

However, after the fall of the Israeli kingdom, Nietzsche believes this worship turned to fear of sin—which began the denaturizing process and instilled false meaning into what he considers to be blind chance.

Nietzsche argues that the “denaturizing” present in both Christianity and Judaism precedes the mythologizing of sin in “scripture” written by priests.

Harnessing their power to alter the written word and call it the word of God, priests deftly secured the keys to salvation for themselves, producing what Nietzsche calls the “prime axiom: ‘God forgiveth him that repenteth’—in plain English, him that submitteth to the priest” (35).

Nietzsche argues that Christianity repurposed the denaturizing practices of the Jewish tradition for the denaturizing of all things, even the last “natural” concept present in Judaism—the “chosen” Jewish people (35).

Christ became the endgame to the ecclesiasticism of Judaism, representing the self-destruction of priestliness—for this reason (and not for the sins of humanity), the Jewish priests and Romans crucified Christ.

Nietzsche questions whether Christ was cognizant of his own contradictions, though he admits he finds the Gospels difficult to decipher. He makes a passing reference to his youthful enjoyment of Das Leben Jesu (Life of Jesus) by David Strauss, but says he is now too old and serious to care for the contradictions of “tradition” (36).

Nietzsche focuses on the “psychological type” of Christ (37). He criticizes French Semitic scholar Ernst Renan’s psychological characterization of Christ as a hero-type, as this concept supports the notion that one person can be superior to others—which is antithetical to Christianity.

Christianity denaturizes the outer world so it can claim “the Kingdom of God is within you” (37).